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Issue 2

COURT REPORTS

clear, given the new permit limit and the transfer of the facility and the
permit, that the court could not reasonably expect Tosco would violate
its permit in the future. Relying on Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw
EnvironmentalServices, Inc., the court determined post-complaint events
might moot claims for civil penalties. The court still had to determine
whether, in this case, civil penalties would deter future violations. CBE
alleged civil penalties would deter Tosco from future CWA violations
because the company operated other refineries managed by the same
staff that assisted Tosco in efforts to comply with the Avon refinery
permit. The court disagreed with CBE, and noted, that given the
structure and procedural requirements of the CWA, CBE could not
rely on allegations of violations at other Tosco facilities to demonstrate
civil penalties would deter Tosco from future violations.
The court granted Tosco's motion for summary judgment after
noting the revision of the permit's limit, the sale of the facility, and the
transfer of the permit made absolutely clear that one could not
reasonably expect Tosco's permit violation to recur. Thus, the court
held no prospect civil penalties would deter future violations.
M. Elizabeth Lokey
United States v. Power Eng'g Co., 125 F. Supp. 2d 1050 (D. Colo.
2000) (granting United States' motion for partial summary judgment
and denying defendant facility operator's motion for partial summary
judgment, noting: (1) EPA "overfiling" was not inappropriate under
the circumstances; (2) United States' suit was not barred by res
judicata or laches; and (3) defendant, as a facility operator, was
required to post financial assurances).
Beginning in 1968, Richard Lilienthal operated an electroplating
business in Denver, Colorado under the name Power Engineering Co.
("PEC"). The processes employed by PEC produced thirteen waste
streams containing more than 1000 kilograms of waste per month.
The materials present in these streams included a number of toxic
substances as identified by the Resource Conservation and Recovery
Act ("RCRA"), including hexavalent chromium.
RCRA authorizes Colorado to administer hazardous waste
programs and monitor production and treatment facilities to insure
compliance with RCRA's effluent standards.
The Colorado
Department of Public Health and the Environment ("CDPHE")
oversees the program.
In 1986, PEC notified CDPHE that its
operations were generating certain hazardous wastes but failed to
indicate its discharge of hexavalent chromium. In 1992, CDPHE
discovered these releases had contaminated groundwater on and
outside of PEC's property. About one year later, PEC informed
CDPHE that in addition to the wastes it had initially reported, PEC was
emitting five additional hazardous wastes.
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CDPHE served PEC with a compliance order demanding that their
operation conform to federal and local regulations. When PEC failed
to meet the terms of the order, CDPHE sued in Colorado state court.
Although CDPHE had authority to demand financial assurances for
remediation from PEC in the proceeding, it declined to seek them.
Because CDPHE failed to obtain financial assurances from PEC, the
federal Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") instituted its own
suit in the federal courts against PEC and Lilienthal individually.
PEC moved for partial summary judgment in response to EPA's
complaint. PEC argued the EPA had engaged in unlawful "overfiling"
and that the doctrine of res judicata precluded the action. PEC's
overfiling argument relied primarily on Harmon Industry, Inc. v.
Browner. In Harmon, the Eighth Circuit found an EPA enforcement
action to be improper because a state action against the same
defendant regarding the same matter was pending when the EPA
brought suit. The Eighth Circuit maintained that under the RCRA,
"the Federal Government can initiate an action... only if...
the
authorized state fails to initiate an enforcement action." The Eighth
Circuit therefore dismissed the government's claim.
In response to PEC's overfiling argument, the district court
concluded the Eighth Circuit incorrectly decided Harmon. The district
court asserted that courts cannot preclude an EPA enforcement action
merely because an authorized state has also sought judicial
enforcement of a regulation. The court noted the Eighth Circuit's
interpretation was flawed because under its reasoning, all EPA
enforcement actions would be precluded in cases where a state filed
suit regardless of whether the EPA's cause of action duplicates the
state action. In accordance with its RCRA interpretation, the district
court determined RCRA did not prohibit the EPA action against PEC.
The district court also denied PEC's motion for partial summary
judgment on the issue of res judicata. The court ruled the doctrine
did not apply because the EPA did not exercise the requisite control
over CDPHE in the state court action and the EPA action was a fully
independent action.
PEC also advanced a number of defenses in response to EPA's
motion for partial summary judgment: (1) the financial assurances
sought by the EPA were not required because PEC was no longer in
violation of RCRA; (2) the progress PEC had made in cleaning up
contaminated soil and water precluded the imposition of an
injunction; and (3) the doctrine of laches barred the EPA's action.
Lilienthal also argued independently that for the purposes of
applicable Colorado regulations, he was not an owner of the PEC
facility.
The court first addressed whether demanding financial assurances
from PEC would be proper. Noting that "[n]othing within RCRA's
'cradle-to-grave' regulatory scheme indicates that owners
and
eperators [sic] of hazardous waste facilities are exempt from providing
financial assurance requirements before remediation," the court held
the EPA was permitted to obtain financial assurances from PEC.
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Under the ruling, EPA could obtain such assurances for past RCRA
violations regardless of whether PEC was acting in violation of the
statute at the time EPA filed its complaint.
The court also found PEC's "tremendous progress" argument
unpersuasive. PEC believed that because it had taken substantial steps
toward remediating the contaminated soils and groundwater, the EPA
could not establish irreparable injury occurred necessary to warrant an
injunction. The court first noted that because PEC had not provided
the financial assurances demanded by the EPA, PEC was in current
violation of RCRA. Citing Tenth Circuit authority, the court found
that "[w]hen the evidence shows that the defendants are engaged
in... practices prohibited by statute.., irreparable harm to the
plaintiffs need not be shown."
PEC's laches argument rested on the premise that because the
government did not act against PEC at an earlier time, the EPA had
abandoned its right to do so. Recognizing an exception to the laches
doctrine exists where the government seeks to protect a public
interest, PEC opined that the EPA's suit served a government, rather
than a public interest. Rejecting this assertion, the court reasoned that
if PEC were not to provide remediation costs, the government would
be forced to do so; these costs in turn would be passed to the public.
Because a public interest was therefore at stake, PEC's laches
argument could not stand.
Lilienthal individually asserted the final response to EPA's motion
for partial summaryjudgment. Lilienthal argued he was not in fact the
operator of the PEC facility. The court disposed of this argument by
simply applying the wording of Colorado regulations to pertinent facts
regarding Lilienthal's holdings. At the time the EPA brought its
action, Lilienthal was president of PEC and owned over half its stock.
According to PEC employee testimony, Lilienthal also made all the
relevant decisions regarding PEC's environmental compliance. The
court recognized other courts have used different tests to determine
whether to consider an individual as an operator for RCRA purposes.
However, the court declined to decide which test courts should apply
since Lilienthal would be considered an operator under each of them.
Jason S. Wells
Burke v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 127 F. Supp. 2d 235 (D.D.C. 2001)
(granting summary judgment motion in favor of the Environmental
Protection Agency where a violator of a discharge permit questioned
the agency's decision to debar him from business with the
government).
From 1989 to 1998, Burke was the president and sole shareholder
of ACMAR Regional Landfill, Inc. ("ACMAR"), which owned and
operated ACMAR Regional Landfill ("the landfill") located in

